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Confirm an action and reauthenticate

Assess existing primitives and the proposed independent intent and authentication requirements.

Status: generic action confirmation remains a reviewed proposal. Version 0.15.0 supplies the dedicated OIDC reauthentication and fresh factor step-up primitives described below, not generic business enforcement.

Current source boundaries

Foundation contains ConfirmationMode.Simple, ConfirmationMode.Password and RequireAuthConfirmationError in Fabricators.Kernel.Common, plus its error serialization/status mapping. These are wire contracts, not enforcement. There is no generic action challenge issuer/store, endpoint requirement or confirmation interceptor shipped with them. StrongAuthentication supplies freshness/assurance checks and purpose-bound authentication proofs separately.

OIDC-only users: dedicated reauthentication

Supplied in 0.15.0; version 0.14.0 still has Login/Link only. OidcLoginPurpose.Reauthenticate uses a server-owned context binding the current subject/session, session-binding hash, already linked issuer/subject and operation hash. It never matches by email, registers an account or links a provider. IOidcReauthenticationAuthority must recheck live admission before redirect, at callback and atomically with its product completion/audit. A product must not register an allow-all adapter or accept these context records from browser JSON.

OidcProvider.SupportsReauthentication defaults to false. Opt in only after validating the configured issuer's freshness capability. Missing capability or authority fails with Authentication.ReauthenticationUnavailable before redirect; callback rejection uses a no-store 403 Authentication.ReauthenticationRejected. Cancellation/failure never clears the existing product session. No local password is required, and unavailable methods must not produce a password/retry loop.

The bridge requests prompt=login, max_age=0 and essential signed auth_time, as specified by OpenID Connect Core. It requires actual provider authentication within the requested age and no earlier than the intent minus a 30-second clock tolerance. It allows at most 30 seconds of future skew and clamps that timestamp to the current instant. Comparisons use DateTimeOffset instants; persisted/transmitted proof times normalize to UTC. New callback/token issuance or account selection alone is insufficient. Provider amr/acr does not automatically establish local MFA or phishing resistance.

After validated primary identity, a trusted host can call CompletePrimaryStepUpAsync with credential/session epochs captured before the ceremony. The host supplies the validated primary actor, exact current session binding and provider authentication time. This mints an audited one-use StepUp proof, not a login proof, and cannot satisfy a stronger MFA policy. Redemption rechecks current freshness, assurance, methods and epochs. The host's atomic completion must still bind the operation hash and fence concurrent revocation; generic Foundation proofs alone do not authorize arbitrary business operations.

An enrolled passkey/TOTP can also renew proof freshness from an older admitted session when AuthenticationPolicy.AllowStepUpFromExistingSession is explicitly enabled. The host still validates the live session on every request; account epochs, actual factor verification and proof freshness remain mandatory. This opt-in does not relax enrollment, login or management freshness requirements. Recovery is not an automatic sensitive-operation fallback. No path invalidates all existing sessions implicitly. Live IdP and physical-device acceptance remain separate from controlled protocol/software-authenticator tests.

Two independent requirements

  1. Intent confirmation: display the actual action/resource and optionally require its current name, identifier or another exact server-defined phrase. This reduces unintended actions; the phrase is not an authentication factor.
  2. Recent authentication: require adequate fresh proof through the account's actual methods: password when present, passkey, MFA or an admitted IdP flow. Do not force a nonexistent local password on SSO/passkey-only users.

Represent these as combinable requirements, not an exclusive Simple/Password switch. A destructive action may require both a typed resource name and fresh phishing-resistant authentication; another operation may require only one. Products own the requirement policy, resource admission and business effects.

GitHub's sudo mode uses recent authentication for sensitive operations and supports methods beyond passwords. OWASP's transaction authorization guidance calls for the user to acknowledge significant transaction data and for the server to protect that data throughout authorization. Neither source defines an interoperable resource-name-confirmation HTTP header standard.

Use an explicit endpoint/action requirement and a generic host error handler. After normal session, authorization and CSRF checks, an unmet requirement should return a no-store 403 challenge with a stable code and structured JSON. The BFF handles it as an interactive continuation, not a generic network retry. No business effect occurs before the challenge is satisfied.

The challenge identifies the action and its admitted resource, expiry and a list of requirements/available verification methods. Resolve display names and expected phrases on the server after authorization; do not accept a client- selected expected phrase or expose inaccessible resource names through errors.

Submit credentials/typed input to a dedicated protected verification endpoint using a JSON body. Reuse Foundation's authentication proofs instead of adding a second password-verification path inside arbitrary business middleware. Do not carry plaintext passwords in custom headers, URLs, logs or retry ledgers. An action ticket is still sensitive even when opaque.

Return a short-lived one-use action ticket. The BFF may attach that ticket in a dedicated header when resuming the original action. Keep passwords and other one-time inputs transient; never automatically replay a write after a generic 401/403/timeout or keep prompting indefinitely on validation failure.

Bind the ticket to the trusted authority/user/session and admitted tenant/ company, action/resource ID and version, semantic payload and all significant query inputs. Include the stable operation/idempotency key where relevant. The product supplies this canonical binding; raw method/path alone is not sufficient. Revalidate current permission and resource state at consumption.

Use an atomic durable consume with bounded expiry/attempts and rate/cooldown limits spanning replacement challenges. Coordinate with the owning transaction and idempotency receipt: one-use authentication is not exactly-once business execution, and consuming a ticket must not make a lost response unrecoverable. Changed input/resource state requires a fresh challenge; reuse of the same operation key must not create a second effect.

Acceptance before implementation/release

Test typed-text mismatch, rename/version change, foreign actor/session/tenant, changed body/query/operation, expiry and concurrent/replayed consumption. Verify wrong/cancelled/expired authentication, SSO/passkey-only users, CSRF, cross-challenge attempt limits, revocation and authorization changes. Exercise lost response/transaction rollback/idempotent recovery through the real BFF. No global session invalidation is implied by confirming an action; revocation remains an explicit product policy.

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