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Integrate strong authentication

Understand passkey, TOTP, recovery and host assurance responsibilities.

Status: backend integration supplied in 0.7.0. Version 0.7.1 adds the policy/metadata corrections below; they are not in 0.7.0. Products own their directory, trusted actor resolution, policy, deployment and client integration; foundation supplies the reusable backend lifecycle.

Methods and assurance

Passkeys use WebAuthn/FIDO2 and the native ASP.NET Core 10 verifier. Platform biometrics or a device PIN can unlock the authenticator. The server receives cryptographic proof and user-verification evidence, never biometric data. Compatible roaming FIDO2 security keys use the same protocol. TOTP supports standards-based Authenticator applications. Recovery codes are one-use emergency credentials; they do not automatically establish MFA or phishing resistance. Proprietary push approvals and YubiOTP remain separate integrations.

No method is enabled by default. Mandatory MFA must complete before ordinary session issuance. CompletePrimaryLoginAsync accepts only a trusted, fresh host actor and current policy; password/OIDC/magic-link verification remains with the host. Never trust a client biometric-success flag or arbitrary OIDC amr/acr.

Register and protect the lifecycle

Compose AddStrongAuthentication, AddNativePasskeys, AddStrongAuthenticationStore, AddInteractiveSessions and AddFoundationSessionHttp. Supply IStrongAuthenticationAuthority and ISessionPrincipalSource with current enabled status, roles and policy. Apply the four authentication mappings and both interactive-session mappings. Own the EF migration and persist/protect shared Data Protection keys across replicas.

UseRouting, UseCors, UseAuthentication and UseAuthorization precede MapFoundationSessions. Select the FoundationSession authentication scheme for product endpoints. Browser/PWA uses Secure/HttpOnly host-only access/refresh cookies and a binding-specific X-Session-CSRF token. Capacitor uses opaque bearer access, rotating refresh and X-Session-Binding in native secure storage. Native requests reject cookies; profile mixing and unrelated origins are rejected. The adapter provides no frontend or Capacitor secure-storage plugin.

A one-use completion proof becomes a session in the same transaction as proof consumption, credentials and audit. Rotation atomically consumes and replaces the refresh token. Same-operation retries return the encrypted short-lived original result; conflicting or superseded requests receive 409. Late replay revokes only the affected family. Every protected request checks authoritative state, both epochs and current roles/policy. Refresh preserves original assurance, method, authentication time and the absolute expiry. In 0.7.1, ordinary factor maintenance preserves sessions while a separate credential revision fences pending challenges/proofs. Global revocation is explicit host policy. In published 0.7.0 every factor mutation still invalidates all sessions.

Version 0.7.1 adds revoke-others, retaining the authenticated caller's family and credentials, plus explicit management assurance/freshness/permission policy. Optional login metadata is disabled by default and encrypted when enabled. IP and user agent are server-observed descriptions; consent-declared GPS/device labels remain unverified client information. See session policy and metadata.

The legacy IUserSessionStore/IAccessTokenIssuer stack is separate and has no automatic migration to this opaque-token adapter. Trusted directory/security events use idempotent InvalidateSubjectAsync; products schedule bounded pruning without deleting unexpired replay evidence or security-event audit IDs too soon.

Native identity and acceptance

Configure exact HTTPS browser origins, Apple team/bundle IDs, Android package IDs and release signing-certificate fingerprints. Association endpoints serve approved metadata on the RP host. Android native origins must match the bound client's approved signing hash; iOS uses the approved HTTPS origin. WebView origins are transport configuration, not implicitly trusted WebAuthn origins.

HTTP software passkey fixtures, real SQLite/PostgreSQL concurrency, rollback, revocation and populated-schema upgrade tests establish backend behavior. Physical Touch ID, Face ID, Windows Hello, YubiKey and actual Capacitor builds still need product acceptance. A local biometric unlock of a stored refresh credential does not renew authentication freshness or raise server assurance.

See browser and Capacitor sessions for exact routes, configuration, retry semantics, migration and deployment requirements. Next: request security and documentation contract.

New-session admission in 0.11.0

SessionPolicy.LoginRequiredAssurance adds a requirement at fresh proof exchange, while RequiredAssurance continues to govern existing sessions and refresh. Raising the login requirement alone preserves established sessions; changing ongoing policy or explicit revocation remains a separate product action. Factor changes still fence pending proofs atomically. AllowRecoverySessions explicitly admits degraded recovery proofs; products must deny credential issuance/linking and other sensitive actions until appropriate reauthentication. Recovery is never silently promoted to MFA.

Start with choose an authentication path for the client/identity decision, then the BFF guide for provider login.

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