# Protect browser and machine requests

Enforce antiforgery, trusted forwarding, key scopes and session revocation.

Goal: enforce browser-write protection and distinguish human sessions from machine
credentials. A package reference alone does not secure an endpoint.

## Browser writes

Configure authentication and authorization in the product. Install an enforcing
antiforgery gate after authorization. Calling UseAntiforgery alone does not enforce
token validation on every JSON write. Anonymous cookie-based writes must opt in
with RequireAntiforgery; reviewed machine/webhook routes may opt out with
DisableAntiforgery while retaining their own authentication.

Expected failure: missing or invalid antiforgery proof rejects the write before
the handler changes data. A valid login cookie alone is insufficient.

## Trusted client address

Use GetClientIp or GetClientIpPartition for audit and rate-limit partitioning.
Never interpret raw Cloudflare or forwarded headers as authority. Authenticated
BFF forwarding is explicitly enabled and requires proof over an overwritten IP
header. Foundation strips forwarding proof before downstream middleware.

## API keys

IApiKeyManager returns random key material once. Persistence stores hashes. The
host registers its EF context, both API-consumer/key configurations, the named
authentication scheme and scope authorization. Issuance and revocation are
administrative operations. A scope does not establish tenant membership.

The lifecycle hydrates the key snapshot before startup completes. Later failures
may use the last good snapshot only within MaximumStaleAge, then resolution fails
closed. Cross-replica revocation convergence follows RefreshInterval; immediate
global invalidation requires product infrastructure.

## Human sessions

In the released legacy stack, refresh rows and the session counter share one database. Revocation
updates them transactionally. IUserSessionStore is the counter's sole owner.
Products implement IAccessTokenIssuer and enforce the counter on protected
requests. Refresh-token replay evidence must remain until expiry.

Version 0.7.0 adds a separate complete opaque-token session adapter with
cookie/CSRF and native bearer/binding profiles, atomic rotation and authoritative
request validation. Its counter has one writer in the authentication/session
store. It does not automatically adopt legacy sessions. Its X-Session-CSRF proof
is distinct from the older antiforgery convention; preserve anonymous-write
protection and explicitly configure product policies when adopting it. See
[strong authentication and sessions](/foundation/0.19.0/guides/strong-authentication/).

## Verify the boundary

Exercise missing tokens, stale snapshots, forged forwarded headers, revoked keys,
insufficient scopes and cross-tenant access through the actual host pipeline.
These checks belong beside the product's authorization integration tests.

Next: [strong authentication](/foundation/0.19.0/guides/strong-authentication/) and
[Kernel HTTP API](/foundation/0.19.0/reference/fabricators-kernel-aspnetcore/).
